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The student of law who undertakes to examine the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113, and to discuss its tendencies, must possess more
than the ordinary amount of that assurance which is supposed to
accompany ignorance if he does not feel hesitation in analyzing
and diffidence in expressing his conclusions upon this difficult and
important question.
His examination of the authorities to which he is accustomed
to turn for sure guidance in complicated and far-reaching mat-
ters leaves him in doubt whether language of cautious generality
should be interpreted as giving a hesitating support to, or as veil-
ing a respectful dissent from, the principles upon which this decis-
ion is based. For the questions involved are much more than
mere legal ones turning upon the application of generally con-
ceded legal principles, or the construction of doubtful phrases.
They put in issue the deep underlying matters of political econ-
omy which are agitating the whole civilized world of our day.
The gist of the decision is an endeavor to give to the indefi-
nite economic ideas of the present time the support of definite
legal principles; or, in other words, to attempt to give to these
definite legal principles a force and extent which, in the minds
of many experienced jurists, they cannot be made legitimately
to sustain. Hence the doubt and dissent with which the decis-
ion has been received. And in face of this uncertainty of the
*Muan v. Illinois, Etc.
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leaders of the legal profession, the student must feel that, in
entering upon a discussion of this subject, he is affording a new
illustration of the saying that fools step in where angels fear to
tread.
To begin with, it will be well to recall briefly the circum-
stances of the case.
Munn, a citizen of Illinois, owned and conducted a grain ele-
vator in Chicago. The Constitution of the State having declared
the business to be a public one, the Legislature passed a statute
for its regulation. This statute required any one in that busi-
ness to procure a license and give a bond; it also fixed a penalty
for failure to comply with these regulations, and required publi-
cation of the rate of charges for each ensuing year, and established
a maximum charge.
Munn, whose business was in active operation before the pas-
sage of this statute, failed to comply with its regulations, and
was fined for his failure. He appealed to the Supreme Court of
Illinois against the conviction, and, the conviction being affirmed,
he sued out a writ of error in the Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted States.
His claim was that the sections of the statute containing the
above-mentioned regulations were unconstitutional and void, and
that they were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which ordains that "No State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."
The question thus squarely presented for the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States was this: Can the Legisla-
ture of a State, putting in force a declaration in its constitution
that a certain business, heretofore a private one, is a public one
and subject to legislative control, compel the owner of such a
business, established before the adoption of the State Constitu-
tion, to submit to have his charges regulated by the Legislature?
Did the Fourteenth Amendment afford him protection in these
circumstances?
The majority of the Supreme Court decided that the statute
in question was constitutional, and that it did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The opinion delivered by Chief Justice Waite argued as fol-
lows: The provision against deprivation as a limitation on the
power of States is old; it is found in Magna Charta, and substan-
tially in nearly all the State Constitutions. It was introduced
into the Constitution of the United States by the Fifth Amend-
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ment, and by the Fourteenth, as a guarantee against State en-
croachment. A member of a body politic necessarily parts with
some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by
his relations to others, he might retain. This does not confer
upon the whole people power to control rights exclusively pri-
vate, but it does authorize laws requiring each citizen to so use
his property as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the
very essence of government, and is the source of the Police Pow-
ers. Under these powers the Government regulates the manner
of using property when necessary to do so for the public good.
Under this power it has always been customary in England and
in this country to fix rates of charges for ferries, common carri-
ers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc.
This has never been said to come within the constitutional pro-
hibition against interference with private property. Hence it is
apparent that down to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use or even
the price of the use of private property necessarily (although they
may sometimes) deprived an owner without due process of law.
As to the principles upon which the power of regulating rests,
the opinion argues that the common law, whence came the right
which the Constitution protects, rules that when private prop-
erty is "affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris pri-
vati only," as was said by Lord Hale in De Portibus Maris, i
Harg. Law Tracts, 78.
The Court then continues: "Property does become clothed
with a public interest when used in a manner to make it
of public consequence, and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an inter-
est in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public
for the common good. to the extent of the interest he has thus
created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use,
but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to the con-
trol."
The opinion then argues that the grain elevator business in
Chicago was a virtual monopoly, and was, therefore, by that,
clothed with a public interest and ceased to bejurisprivati. "It
might not have been made so by the statute of Illinois, but it
was made so by the facts." It was immaterial that no precedent
could be found for a statute precisely like this, as the facts
showed a new development of commercial progress, and the statute
simply extends the law to meet it. Nor did it matter that the
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owner's business was started before the regulations were adopted,
as he was from the beginning subject to the power of the
body politic to require him to conform to regulations established
for the public good.
As to an owner's right to a reasonable compensation, and as
to whether it is for the Legislature or the judiciary to decide as
to reasonableness, the opinion says that in common law countries
it is customary for the Legislature to declare a maximum, beyond
which any charge made would be unreasonable. In private con-
tracts the reasonableness is judicially determined, because the
Legislature has no control over such contracts.
"The controlling fact is the power to regulate at all, and
where that exists the right to establish a maximum of charge, as
one of the means of regulation, is implied."
To sum up the material points of the above argument, it
would appear:
That the admitted limitation of the power of deprivation by
the State is itself limited by the duty of the citizen, as a member
of the body politic, to so use his property as not unnecessarily to
injure others. This duty of the citizen the State has a right to
enforce by the Police Powers, and such exercise, in certain speci-
fied cases, has been unresisted from all time.
That this power of regulation is derived from the common
law, and is properly exercised over private property when affected
with a public interest.
That such public interest does arise whenever one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest.
That this business was a virtual monopoly, and this notwith-
standing its vast importance, and, therefore, it was clothed with
a public interest, ceased to bejurisprivati only, and became sub.
ject to regulation by the public.
I proceed now to examine this argument and point out the ob-
jections that have been made to it.
The first important matter for consideration is the Police
Power of the State.
Vague and almost impossible of definition as are the Police
Powers of a State, it may be taken as established that such a use of
one's property as unnecessarily to injure others can always be pre-
vented by State interference. "The Police Power of a State, in a
comprehensive sense, embraces its whole system of internal regu-
lation, by which the State seeks not only to preserve the public
order and to prevent offenses against the State, but also to estab-
lish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of
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good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to
prevent a conflict of rights, and to ensure to each the uninter-
rupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent
with a like enjoyment of rights by others."I
It is needless as it would be tedious to multiply quotations
from the numerous cases in which Police Powers have been de-
fined, or, rather, described, but it may be remarked in passing
that many of them emphasize the distinction between these pow-
ers and that of eminent domain, which latter can only be exer-
cised on condition of providing compensation therefor.
On the other hand, the Police Power extends, in cases to
which it is applicable, to the absolute destruction of private prop-
erty, without providing any compensation at all.
"The acknowledged Police Power of a State extends often to
the destruction of property; a nuisance may be abated. Every-
thing prejudicial to the health or morals of a city may be re-
moved. '2
But a reference to some of the principal cases in which the
Police Power has been exercised, and upheld by the Supreme
Court, will show that there had been some element in each case
which afforded at least an ostensible reason for the interference
of the State, on the ground that the health, morals, or safety of
the public were affected.
Thus, in the Slaughter House Cases,8 an exclusive privilege
of slaughtering cattle within an area of more than one thousand
miles was sustained. It can be imagined that regulations regard-
ing the slaughtering of animals might be necessary for the pub-
lic health. This decision was followed in the case of New Or-
leans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Co., 4 which granted
exclusive privileges for lighting a city, and this case was distin-
guished from Stone v. Mississippi5 and Butchers' Union v.
Crescent City Co., 6 on the ground that the contract was not in
any legal sense to the prejudice of the public health or safety.
In Patterson v. Kentucky,7 a State statute was held valid
which imposed a penalty for selling patented oils of a dangerously
inflammable nature.
I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) 704.
2 McLean. J.. in The License Cases, 5 How. 504.
S i6 Wall. 36.
4 Ir5 U. S. 650.
5 1oi U. S. 814.
6 111 U. S. 746.
7 97 U. S. 501.
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In Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,8 the Court sustained an
ordinance which destroyed the business of the Fertilizing Com-
pany, it having become a nuisance, and dangerous to the health
of the inhabitants.
In Barbier v. Connolly9 and Soon Hing v. Crowley 10 ordi-
nances which regulated the hours of work in laundries were
sustained.
The above cases are instances of the exercise of the Police
Power which, though not unanimously conceded, seem capable
of being brought within the scope of the power.
But some later cases appear to have materially extended the
application of the Police Power.
Thus in Powell v. Penn.," the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a statute of Pennsylvania prohibiting the sale of oleo-
margarine, although there was no evidence of its injurious effect
on the health of the people. Justice Harlan says in his opinion's:
"And as it does not appear upon the face of the statute,
or from any facts of which the Court must take judicial cogni-
zance, that it infringes rights secured by fundamental law, the
legislative determination is conclusive upon the Court."
This decision has met with much disapproval. Justice Field,
in his dissenting opinion, 18 says:
"Here the article was healthy and nutritious, in no respect
injuriously affecting the health of anyone. It was manufactured
pursuant to the laws of the State. I do not, therefore, think that
the State could forbid its sale or use; clearly not without com-
pensation to its owner. Regulations of its sale and restraints
against its improper use undoubtedly could be made, as they may
be made with respect to all kinds of property; but the prohibition
of its use and sale is nothing less than confiscation. * * * I
have no doubt of the power of the State to regulate its sale when
such regulation does not amount to the destruction of the right
of property in it. The right of property in an article involves the
right to sell and dispose of such article, as well as to use and
enjoy it. Any act which declares that the owner shall neither sell
it nor dispose of it, nor use and enjoy it, confiscates it, depriving
him of his property without due process of law. Against such
8 97 U. S. 659.
9 113 U. S. 31.
10 113 U. S. 703.
11 127 U. S. 678.
12 p. 685.
18 p. 699.
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arbitrary legislation by any State the Fourteenth Amendment
affords protection. But the prohibition of sale in any way or for
any use is quite a different thing from a regulation of the sale or
use, so as to protect the health and morals of the community.
The fault which I find with the opinion of the Court on this head
is that it ignores the distinction between regulation and prohibi-
tion. "
The Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Marx14,
was called upon to decide the constitutionality of a State statute
of New York involving the same question as that in Powell v.
Pennsylvania, and it came to the conclusion that the statute was
unconstitutional. Judge Dillon, commenting on the conflicting
decisions as above, says :15
"We cannot refrain from expressing our full concurrence in
the views and conclusions of the Court of Appeals of New York in
People v. Marx. It will not escape observation that the Court
of Appeals of New York and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reached opposite conclusions on a question relating so vitally to
the natural, inalienable, and primordial rights of the citizen. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustaining the
Act of 1885, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and on like grounds if the New York statute (which was in
judgment in the case of People v. Marx) had been before the
Supreme Court of the United States its validity would have been
upheld, unless the Supreme Court had followed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals. We have at all events that which
is regarded as a fundamental right in New York considered
not to be such in Pennsylvania. * * * * We cannot but
express our regret that the Constitutions of the States or
that of the United States, admits of a construction that it is
competent for a State Legislature to suppress (instead of
regulating) under fine and imprisonment the business of man-
ufacturing and selling a harmless and even wholesome article,
if the legislature chooses to affirm, contrary to the fact, that the
public health or public policy requires such suppression. The
record of the conviction of Powell for selling, without any decep-
tion, a healthful and nutritious article of food, makes one's blood
tingle."
In the same year, x887, the case of Mugler v. Kansas, came
before the Supreme Court of the United States16. Mugler was
14 99 N. Y. 377.
15 Dillon on Mun. Corps., p. 21M, Note i.
16 123 U. S. 623.
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the owner of a brewery in Knasas, and the Legislature of that
State, enforcing a constitutional restriction upon the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors, passed a statute which practi-
cally destroyed Mugler's business, and rendered his property
worthless. Under it he had been compelled to submit to the de-
struction of liquors already manufactured, and of bottles, glasses
and other utensils of his trade.
The majority of the Court upheld the validity of the Kansas
statute, even to its affecting property engaged in the business
when a lawful one. Justice Harlan says on this point:17
"This is not depriving the citizen of his property without due
process of law, and that interpretation of the i 4 th Amendment
is inadmissible. It cannot be supposed that the States intended,
by adopting that Amendment, to impose restraints upon the exer-
cise of their power for the protection of the safety, health, or
morals of the community." And further:18 "The principle
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law * * * has never been regarded as in-
compatible with the principle equilly vital, because essential to
the peace and safety of society, that all property in this country is
held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community." And again:19 "The
exercise of the Police Power by the destruction of property which
is itself a public nuisance; or the prohibition of its use in a par-
ticular way whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very differ-
ent from taking property for public use, or from depriving a per-
son of his property without due process of law. In the one case a
nuisance only is abated, in the other unoffending property is taken
away from an innocent owner."
This decision was affirmed and followed on a similar state of
facts in Kidd v. Pierson.2°
Commenting upon statutes of this kind, Judge Cooley says :2
"Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the Leg-
islature to make such regulations as may destroy the value of
property, without compensation to the owner appears in a more
striking light. than in the case of these statutes. The trade in
alcoholic drinks being lawful, and the capital employed in it
being fully protected by law, the, Legislature then steps in and by
17 123 U. S. 664.
18 p. 665.
19 p. 669.
20 128 U. S. 1.
21 Cooley's Const. Limit. 719.
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an enactment based on general reasons of public utility annihi-
lates the traffic, destroys altogether the employment, and reduces
to a nominal value the property on hand. Even the keeping of
that, for the purposes of sale, becomes a criminal offense; and,
without any change whatever in his own conduct or employment,
the merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal of today, and
the very building in which he lives and conducts the business
which to that moment was lawful becomes the subject of legal
proceedings, if the statute shall so declare, and liable to be pro-
ceeded against for a forfeiture. A statute which can do this must
be justified upon the highest reasons of public benefit; but,
whether satisfactory or not, the reasons address themselves exclu-
sively to the legislative wisdom."
It is submitted that the cases last cited differ in principle from
the earlier decisions in that the injury to the public, by which
the exercise of the Police Power is justified, is one more of opin-
ion than fact, and in this distinction lies the root of the dissent to
them. All opinions would agree in principle that the indiscrimi-
nate slaughter of animals might be gravely prejudicial to the
health, or the unrestricted sale of peculiarly inflammable oils
dangerous to the safety of the community, as might be also the
injudicious exercise of a calling which might threaten fire. In
such cases the majority without special knowledge of the facts
would be likely to accept as correct, and to abide by the decision
of those whose duty it was to watch over the public health and
safety.
But when these plain principles, founded on states of fact
which command universal assent, are passed, and the heated and
hazy realm of opinion is entered upon, the conditions are changed.
Instead of the exercise by the State of a salutary protective
power, whose sphere and limits are understood and acquiesced in
by all, there is substituted the spasmodic activity of a fluctuating
public opinion. If the final word as to what is or what is not
within the scope of the Police Power be left to a legislative major-
ity, all security to the citizen is gone; all he has, all he does,
would be subject to the veto or the regulation of the omnipotent
half plus one.
A careful consideration of the disapproval shown towards the
decisions of Powell v. Pennsylvania and Mugler v. Kansas will, I
think, indicate that great as are the objections to them on the
ground of their interference with property rights, the fundamental
objection is the menace to the liberty of the citizen which they
contain.
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In his address to the graduating class of the Yale Law School
last year, the Hon. W. E. Russell dwelt upon the tendency to
incorporate more and more minute details into State constitu-
tions, in order to place such matters beyond the changing ideas
of legislative majoi-ities. He says :2
"An illustration of the evil to which I refer may be found in
the experience of some of our States with constitutional prohibi-
tion. However wise and necessary prohibition may be, the
proper place for this much-controverted restriction is in statute,
not constitutional, law. Dependent for its enforcement upon.
statute law and a sustaining -.public sentiment, it gains little by
constitutional recognition, while the constitution itself may suffer
by the evasions and opposition of a discontented people unable
lawfully to assert their will. Referring to this danger a distin-
guished jurist has forcibly said a constitution is not a code, civil
or penal; and whatever tends to turn it into one endangers its
ultimate stability by exposing it to every gust of popular excite-
ment or caprice. * * * To put into a constitution a rule
which a statute would sufficiently prescribe, and which must be
supplemented by a statute to make it effective would be simply to
take advantage of the greater permanency of the organic law in
the interest of a majority, for a purpose quite foreign to the pur-
pose of that instrument, and might well argue a distrust on the
part of that majority of their ability to maintain their ground in
the convictions of the people. If this be it significance * *
* it would exemplify that tyranny of the majority which the
friends as well as the foes of democratic institutions concede to
be their greatest inherent danger."
And again:2:3 "This modern constitutional growth with
its excessive government and its many restrictions firmly fast-
ened on the people seems also to conflict with the principle of
freedom from restraint which is the very essence of democracy,
finding expression in such terms as free institutions, civil liberty
and self g'overnment. With its more of control and less of com-
pact it marks an evolution backward in the progress of civiliza-
tion. The time was, says Spencer, when the history of a people
was but the history of its government. It is otherwise now.
The once universal despotism was but a manifestation of the ex-
treme necessity of restraint. Feudalism, serfdom, slavery, all
tyrannical institutions, are merely the most vigorous kinds of
rule, springing out of, and necessary to, a bad state of man. The
22 Address of Hon. \V E. Russell to Yale Law School, June, 1894, p. 30.
23 p. 28.
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progress from these is in all cases the same, less government.
Constitutional forms mean this. Political freedom means this.
Democracy means this."
But if the constitutions themselves afford no practical protec-
tion against the insidious invasion of this subtle power, the citi-
zen feels that he has no longer any firm ground under him. All
the conditions of his daily life must be shadowed by a feeling of
insecurity which will deaden his energies, and destroy his happi-
ness and -sefulness.
This discussion of the Police Power is, perhaps, not strictly
within the scope of the subject of this essay, but it has been entered
upon with the object of attempting to show that the princi-
ples of the application of the Police Power have undergone con-
siderable change. Constitutional provisions seem to be not only
flexible but squeezable.
But coming now to the immediate question, we find that the
application of the Police Power is even more elastic than the
above discussion has shown it to be. In the case of Munn v. Illi-
nois, no question of the health, morals, or safety of the community
was in issue. The State of Illinois determined that it would be
for the benefit of the State that grain elevators should be under
public control, and the thing was done. And the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld this action as a legitimate exercise of
the Police Power, on the ground that the grain elevators were
property affected with a public interest. The wide-spread dissent
from this decision seems to emphasize the position taken above,
that the more the Police Power is invoked to carry out matters of
opinion the more danger is there in its application. For of all
the various "squeezes" which the constitutional provision has re-
ceived, this one seems to have been the hardest. The only matter
of fact that existed in the case was that the business was a mo-
nopoly, and that was qualified by its being only of a "virtual"
kind.
In the face of these conditions, the Court took a legal "leap
in the dark," and by a construction of the applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment to restrain State Police Power gave that
clause a shock which in the minds of many eminent jurists
deprived it of any practical force for the future. For the question
is one of construction primarily.
"It should be observed, however, that this question is simply
one of construction, the object being to ascertain the true mean-
ing of the constitutional amendment. No argument can be of
service in solving this question, except by throwing light upon
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the purposes for which the Amendment was passed. The prohi-
bition is absolute in terms, and, as was pointed out by Justice
Field, the right to enjoy life and liberty is guarded by no more
stringent provisions than the right to enjoy property. It is rea-
sonable to imply that the Amendment was not designed to impair
the power of the States to enact such laws as were by common
consent, at the time of the adoption of the Amendment, deemed
within the proper and ordinary sphere of legislative action, even
though private rights should thereby be interfered with, but it
would not be reasonable to carry this implication further. The
States have always the power to take private property when the
public interest demands this, by exercise of the power of eminent
domain, upon providing just compensation. "24
That my statement as to the effect on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is justified the following will show: "This doctrine that
whenever one's property is used in such a manner as to affect the
community at large it becomes clothed with a public interest and
ceases to bejurisprivati only, destroys the efficacy of the consti-
tutional guarantee. '2
The next point in the argument is that because in England
and in this country it has always been customary to regulate fer-
ries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, inn-
keepers, etc., and that this has never been regarded as coming
within the constitutional provision against interference with pri-
vate property, therefore it is apparent that down to the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes
regulating the use, or even the price of the use of private prop-
erty necessarily deprived an owner without due process of law.
In view of the objections that have been made to this proposi-
tion, some of which are given below, it may not be thought pre-
sumptuous to express the opinion that a more remarkable non
sequitur seldom appears in a judicial opinion:
"Formerly it was common by legislation to regulate wages,
and the prices of merchandise, or whatever any one person might
have to dispose of to another. To some extent this was done in
this country in colonial days, but never generally; and the old
laws on the subject were unquestionably innovations on common
right, and usurpations of authority. In some cases, however, the
right to regulate charges is still exercised, and in the following
cases may be justified on principle:
24 Morawetz on Private Corporations (speaking of 'Munn V. Ill.) Vol. 2,
pp. X033-1o34.
25 Field J. in Munn v. Ill.
PROPERTY AFFECTED BY PUBLIC INTEREST. 61
"1. Where the business is one the following of which is not
a matter of right, but is permitted by the State as a privilege or
franchise (lotteries, ferries, tolls).
"2. When the State on public grounds renders to the business
special assistance by taxation, or under the eminent domain (rail-
roads).
"j. When, for the accommodation of the business, special
privileges are given in the public streets, or exceptional use of
public property or easement (hackmen).
"4. When exclusive privileges are granted in consideration of
some special return to the public, or in order to secure something
to the public not otherwise obtainable (Slaughter House Cases,
16 Wall. 36)."
The author continues significantly: "To these may be added:
"s. Those employments which are quasi public and essential
to the business of the country, but of which the circumstances
give to a few persons a virtual monopoly at each important com-
mercial center; such as those who own elevators for the storage
of grain have in the city of Chicago.' '
It is to be observed that the fifth class is not included by the
author among those which may be justified on principle.
"Hale's doctrine of property as affected by a public interest
referred only to property dedicated by the owner to public use,
or to property the use of which was granted by the government,
or in connection with which special privileges were conferred. "
This is the view of Hale's doctrine taken by the learned author
of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, as follows: "The phrase
'affected with a public interest' has been brought into recent dis-
cussions from the treatise De Portibus Maris of Lord Hale,
where the important passage is as follows:" quoting the whole
passage which ends thus:
"'For now the wharf, crane, and other conveniences are
affected with public interest, and they cease to be Juris privati
only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land,
it is now no longer bare private interest but is affected by a
public interest.' "
The author comments on this also:
"If the case of a street thrown open to the public is an apt
illustration of the public interest Lord Hale had in mind, the in-
terest is very manifest. It will be equally manifest in the case
of the wharf, if it is borne in mind that the title to the soil under
26 Cooley's Const. Law, 245-246.
27 Field J. in Munn v. Ill.
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navigable water in England is in the Crown, and that wharves
can ohaly be erected by express or implied license, and can only
be made available by making use of this public property in the
soil. If then, by public permission, one is making use of the
public property, and he chances to be the only one with whom the
public can deal in respect to the use of that property, it seems en-
tirely reasonable to say that his business is affected with a public
interest which requires him to deal with the public on reason-
able terms. "
It is difficult to conceive how the facts in Munn v. Illinois can
be brought within those classes which Cooley says may be justified
on principle.
The English case of A.llnutt v. Inglis was also relied upon
as supporting the right of regulation on account of the "virtual
monopoly."
But what says Lord Ellenborough in his opinion in that case?
"Here, then, the company's warehouses were invested with
the monopoly of a public privilege, and therefore they must by
law confine themselves to take reasonable rates for the use of
them for that purpose. If the Crowz should hereafter think it
advisable to extend the privileges more generally to other persons and
places, so far as that the public will not be restrained from exer-
cising a choice of warehouses for the purpose, the company may
be enfranchised from the restriction which attaches upon a mo-
nopoly: but at present, while the public are so restricted to ware-
house their goods with them for the purpose of bonding, they
must submit to that restriction, and it is enough that there exists
in the place and for the commodity in question a virtual monop-
oly of the warehousing for this purpose, on which the principle of
law attaches as laid down by Lord Hale in the passage referred to,
which includes the good sense as well as the law of the subject. "30
The words I have italicized clearly show that this monopoly
was one created by the sovereign authority, and removed only
by its action.
It seems, therefore, that the English authorities quoted in sup-
port of the decision show only that private property is affected
with a public interest when public land is used by a private per-
son under a license express or implied, or when the owner of
private land himself dedicates it to a public use, or when a mo-
nopoly conferring peculiar advantages is granted by the State.
28 Cooley's Const. Limit. 737-738.
29 12 East 527.
80 pp. 540-541.
PROPERTY AFFECTED BY PUBLIC INTEREST. 63
The principle that the public interest attaches when the mo-
nopoly is a legal one seems to be further supported by the words
of Chief Justice Holt, as follows :31
"Now there are two sorts of acts for doing damage to a man's
employment for which an action lies, the one in respect of a
man's privilege, the other in respect of his property. In that of
a man's franchise or privilege whereby he hath a fair, market,
or ferry, if another shall use the like liberty, though out of his
limits, he shall be liable to an action, though by grant from the
king. But therein is the difference to be taken between a liberty
in which the public hath a benefit, and that wherein the public
is not concerned."
It may be admitted that in Munn's case there was a virtual
monopoly, but, as is pointed out by Justice Brewer, n "There
are two kinds of monopoly, one of law, the other of fact. The
one exists when exclusive privileges are granted; such a monop-
oly the law which creates alone can break, and being the crea-
tion of law, justifies legal control. A monopoly of fact anyone
can break, and there is no necessity for legislative interference."
This surely is the kind of monopoly that Munn had.
The attempt to bring the case within the classes of the occu-
pations named in the opinion as subject to legislative regulation
(common carriers, hackmen, etc.) seems hardly to be more suc-
cessful. For my quotation from Cooley's Constitutional Law
shows that all these occupations receive a privilege or benefit
from the State.
In the case of People v. Budd,33 a similar state of facts
was in issue, and the New York Court of Appeals followed the
decision of the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois, and upheld the
validity of the statute. In his dissenting opinion in this case,
Peckham, J., forcibly sets forth his view of what constitutes a
dedication to public use. He says:
"I contend that within the subject now under review, the
meaning of the phrase 'devoting one's property to a public use,'
as evidenced in the cases cited by the learned Chief Justice (of
New York), and also in other cases in this State, is that such
devotion or dedication is made when, by reason of it, the public
thereafter have a legal right to resort to the property and to use
it for a reasonable compensation, or for such as the law provides,
or else where some privilege or right is granted by the govern-
31 Keeble v. Hickeringill, ii East 575.
32 Budd v. N. Y.. I43 U. S. 517.
33 117 N. Y. x.
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ment, in which case the right of limitation is based upon, and is
really a part consideration for the grant.' '84 And further:
"The facts of the case must be taken into account whenever
expressions are used of a somewhat general nature, and it is evi-
dent that when the English judges and courts spoke of an owner
of property devoting it to a public use, or one in which the pub-
lic had an interest, they meant that by reason of such devotion,
the public thereafter had a right to resort to the place where the
property was, and a legal right to demand its use on payment of
a reasonable compensation.' ' And again: "Whenever it
has been claimed heretofore that property has been devoted to a
public use, the term has expressed the fact which existed; that
the public had a right of resort to the premises and to use the
property, or to demand transportation, etc., upon reasonable com-
pensation being paid or tendered. "86
Enough has been said to show that in the opinion of those
who dissent from the views of the majority of the Supreme Court
on this point, the authorities cited by the decision do not support
its conclusions, and furthermore, that the circumstances which
do in reality affect private property with a public interest are
clearly defined.
To repeat Judge Peckham's expressions, "the term has ex-
pressed the fact'which existed, the public had a right to use the
property upon reasonable compensation."
But the Supreme Court says: "Property does become clothed
with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public
consequence, and affect the community at large. When, there-
fore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use.'"
No reflection is necessary to perceive the unliiited 'scope of
these words. No intention on the part of the owner to dedicate,
no waiver of public right in his favor on the part of the public is
required to establish this interference with his business and its
profits. All that is requisite is that he shall devote his property to
a use in which the public has an interest. The far-reaching effect
of this doctrine has been shown by the great lawyers who have
criticised it and dissented from it, as the following quotations will
illustrate.
Justice Field says in his dissenting opinion:
"The majority opinion holds that as the public are interested
84 117 N. Y. 41.
85 p. 52.
86 p. 59.
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in the storage of grain, the defendant, by devoting the building
to that storage has granted to the public an interest in that use,
and must submit to have his compensation regulated by the Leg-
islature. If this be sound law, all property and all business are
held at the mercy of a majority of the Legislature."
Justice Brewer says :37
"There is scarcely any property in whose use the public has
no interest. No man liveth unto himself alone, and no man's
property is beyond the touch of another's welfare. Everything,
the manner and extent of whose use affects the well-being of
others, is property in whose use the public has an interest."
And further on: "If it (the government) may regulate the price
of one service which is not a public service, or the compensation
for the use of one kind of property which is not devoted to a
public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate the price
of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all
property?"
In an address by the Hon. George Hoadly of New York,88
the cases in which the right of the citizen to protection of life,
liberty and property has been in question are reviewed, and cer-
tain conclusions are drawn, the fourth and fifth of which are as
follows:
" 4 th. That all property and avocations in which the public
have an interest are so devoted to the service of this public that
they may be controlled by the Legislative power without the neces-
sity of resort to the power of eminent domain, or compensation.
" 5 th. That as the extent of the Police Power is indefinite, so
also are the facts and circumstances which shall constitute such
practical dedication of property or services to others, indefinite.
At present they are expressed under an et cetera, and it is reserved
for the future judiciary to explain this symbol and give its full
and accurate meaning."
And Judge Cooley"9 says:
"What circumstances shall affect property with a public inter-
est is not very clear. The mere fact that the public have an in-
terest in the existence of the business, and are accommodated by
it cannot be sufficient, for that would subject the stock of the
merchant and his charges to public regulation. The public have
an interest in every business in which an individual offers his
wares, his merchandise, his services, or his accommodations to the
37 Budd v. N. Y., 143 U. S. 517.
38 Journal of Social Science, No. 26.
89 Cooley's Const. Limit. 737.
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public, but his offer does not place him at the mercy of the public
in respect to charges and prices."
To sum up the foregoing examination.
The decision in Munn v. Illinois, founded upon old common
law authorities which, as was said by Justice Field, are in con-
flict with it, sanctions an application of the Police Power of the
State so extended that the constitutional guarantee is nullified,
and all power of resistance to the taking of property is logically
destroyed. It only remains for me, in leaving this part of the
subject, to note that in this decision two Justices dissented.
In Budd v. New York40 a similar case, decided in 189i, the
minority was increased to three; and in Brass v. Stoeser,41 de-
cided in 1893, on substantially the same state of facts, the minority
again added one to its strength, four Justices dissenting.
It should also be noted that in this last case the Dakota stat-
ute, in addition to requiring the storage of grain for everybody
who demanded it at a fixed price, imposed upon the owner of the
warehouse the additional burden of advancing money to insure
the property thus forced upon him. Justice Brewer in his dis-
senting opinion says that if the Legislature can do this, "I can
only say that it seems to me that the country is rapidly travel-
ing the road which leads to that point where all freedom of con-
tract and conduct will be lost. "4 It would seem from this
last case that the quality of being affected with a public interest
attaches to the cash of the owner of a grain warehouse as well as
to the warehouse itself.
One more matter connected with the past history of this subject.
In 1889 the Supreme Court, in the case of Chicago, etc., R.
R. v. Minnesota, 4 decided that when the Legislature establishes
a railroad commission, and the Act is interpreted by the Supreme
Court of the State as providing that the rates of charges recom-
mended and published by the commission should be conclusive on
the railroad companies, and that, therefore, there can be no
judicial inquiry as to the reasonableness of these rates, the Act
is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, as it de-
prived the company of its property without due process of law,
and of the equal protection of the laws. From this decision three
Justices dissented.
Justice Bradley, in his dissenting opinion, says:
40 143 U. S. 517.
41 153 U. S. 391.
42 152 U. S. 410.
43 134 U. S. 418.
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"This decision practically overrules Munn v. Illinois, the gov-
erning principle of which was that the regulation and settlement
of the fares of railroads and other public accommodations is a
legislative and not a judicial prerogative. I differ from the
majority of the Court in thinking that the final tribunal is the Leg-
islature, they the judiciary."
Thus far I have dealt with the matter involved in this decis-
ion from the point of view of the arguments adduced in its sup-
port in the decision itself, examining these arguments in the
light of legal precedence, and testing them by the criticism of
legal authorities. And the foregoing pages will, I think, have
shown that, viewed as a legal question only, the unlimited scope
of the doctrine cannot be supported. Can any other reasons be
found for sustaining the decision? In what follows I shall try
and show that there can.
A very careful study of the opinion as it was delivered by
Chief Justice Waite leaves the student in wonder that the conclu-
sions arrived at from the authorities used as support could ever
have commended themselves to the Court. So untenable do they
appear that one is forced to seek some underlying ground of right
or expediency as the real foundation for the decision, the argu-
ments being made to support the conclusion, rather than the con-
clusion being deduced from the argument. With this in mind,
the following passage in the opinion seems of great significance:
"It is of no moment that no precedent can be found for a
statute precisely like this. The business was one of recent origin,
rapid growth, and one in which the whole public has a direct
and positive interest. This statute simvply eztends the law to mneet
this new developnment of commynercial progress. There is no attempt
to compel these owners to grant the public an interest in the pro-
perty, but to declare their obligations if they use it in this par-
ticular manner."
The words I have emphasized seem to contain the germ of the
principle upon which the decision was made. Later on the Chief
Justice says:
"Rights of property created by common law cannot be taken
away without due process, but the law itself, as a rule of conduct,
may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the Legisla-
ture, unless prevented by constitutional limitation. The great
office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they
are developed." It is true that he also says: "To limit the rate
of charges for services rendered in a public employment, or for
the use of property in which the public has an interest, is only
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changing a regulation which existed before. It establishes no
new principles in the law, but only gives effect to an old one."
This latter statement, however, takes nothing from the former
ones, for the question in this case was whether the public had
such an interest in the business as to justify the regulation of the
charges made in it, not, whether, granting the interest, the regu-
lation could be made. It would appear, then, that the real prin-
ciple of the judgment is that the statute simply extends the law
to meet this new development of commercial progress.
What does this mean? It means that the progress of events
had given to a few individuals, exercising a lawful private trade,
a virtual control over the grain business passing through Chicago,
and that the Legislature had therefore placed this private busi-
ness under public regulation by this statute. It was in effect a
statute against monopolies. Hence we have the principle, Mo-
nopoly justifies Control.
It can hardly be denied that the old common law exercised
such control, whether the monopoly was one of law or one of fact,
and the way it viewed attempts to enhance the price of the nec-
essaries of life is forcibly set forth in the case of Rex v. Wadding-
ton44 decided in i8oi.
The defendant was indicted for what would, in our day, be
termed trying to "corner" hops.
Lord Kenyon says:
"But this is to me most evident, that in whatever manner the
supply is made, if a number of rich persons are to buy up the
whole or any considerable part of the produce from whence such
supply is derived, in order to make their own private and exorbi-
tant advantage of it to the public detriment, it will be found to
be an evil of the greatest magnitude, and I am warranted in say-
ing that it is a most heinous offense against religion and morality,
and against the established law of the country.. That our law
books do declare practices of the sort with which the defendant is
charged to be offenses at common law cannot be denied." 45
Lord Kenyon then meets the objection that the statutes 5 and
6, Ed. vi., C. 14, against regratorg, forestallers and engrossers,
having declared what the common law was, and it having been
determined that hops were not a victual within the Act, there-
fore the engrossing of hops was never an offense at common law,
not being a necessary of life, by showing that times had changed,
and that hops had now become necessaries. He continues by
44 x East 141.
4 5 p. 154.
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saying that if the defendant went into the market "for the pur-
pose of making his purchases in the fair course of dealing, with
a view of afterwards dispersing the commodity which he col-
lected in proportion to the wants and conveniences of the public,
whatever profit accrues to him from the transaction no blame is
imputable to him. On the contrary, if the whole of his conduct
shows plainly that he did not make his purchases in the market
with this view, but that his traffic there was carried on with a
view to enhance the price of the commodity, to deprive the peo-
ple of their ordinary subsistence, or else to compel them to pur-
chase it at an exorbitant price, who can deny that this is an
offense of the greatest magnitude? It was the peculiar policy of
this system of laws to provide for the wants of the poor laboring
classes of the country."4G
"It is our duty to take care that persons in pursuing their own
particular interests do not transgress these laws which were made
for the benefit of the whole community. I am perfectly satisfied
that the common law remains in force with respect to offenses of
this nature. * * * There I find nothing which trenches on
what I have said, but only a repeal of certain statutes, upon none
of which is this prosecution founded, but upon the common
law." 47
And Grose, J., says in the same case:
"When, however, we recollect the anxiety shown by our an-
cestors to prevent the commission of this class of offenses, and
when we recollect what the common law as handed down to us
by our ablest reporters and commentators upon this subject is, we
cannot but deem that it would be a precedent of most awful
moment for this Court to declare that hops, which are an article
of merchandise and which we are compelled to use for the pre-
servation of the common beverage of the people of this country,
are not an article, the price of which it is a crime by undue
means to enhance; or that the statute 12 Geo. III., C. 71, which
expressly repeals certain specified statutes, was intended to repeal
other statutes not specified, and to repeal that which the com-
mon law of the land has ordained for the protection of the poor,
in preventing the advancing of the price of those commodities
without which they cannot exist.48
"In mitigation of punishment the Court has been repeatedly
and strongly addressed upon the freedom of trade, as if it were
46 1 East 157-158.
47 pp. 158-159.
48 pp. 162-i63.
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requisite to support the freedom of trade that one man shall be
permitted, for his own private emolument, to enhance the price
of commodities become necessaries of life, and thereby possibly
prevent a large portion of his majesty's subjects from purchasing
those necessaries at all. The freedom of trade, like the liberty
of the press, is one thing, the abuse of that freedom, like the
licentiousness of the press, is another. God forbid that this
Court should do anything that should interfere with the legal
freedom of trade. * * * But the same law that protects the
proprietors of merchandise takes an interest also in the concerns
of the public; by protecting the poor man against the avarice of
the rich; and from all times it has been an offense against the
public to commit practices to enhance the price of merchandise
coming to market, particularly the necessaries of life, for the pur-
pose of enriching an individual. * * * For the sake of the
public, and especially of the poorer part of his majesty's subjects,
the law pays particular respect to the necessaries of life, the price
of which a man is not permitted to enhance by undue means for
his own private profit. In these and other respects the freedom
of trade has its limits, and is, and must be, like our other liber-
ties, regulated by law. ,19
1 have quoted this opinion at somelength, as it seems to show
that the common law at all times would interfere to prevent any-
thing done by a private individual that might unduly enhance,
to his profit, the necessaries of life.
The Court in Munn v. Illinois, appear to have applied the rea-
soning of the common law courts applicable to cases of virtual
monopolies of law to a case where the virtual monopoly was one
of fact. If this latter case of monopoly was controllable at all at
common law, it was under the principles laid down in Rex v.
Waddington, quoted above.
In Munn's case the article affected was grain, the first of all
necessaries of life; the charges made by the warehouseman were
thought by the Legislature of Illinois to be excessive and unfair.
Have we not here all the elements necessary to bring the case
within the controlling power of the old common law as laid down,
above? It would seem that if the Court, finding this to be a case
for which, as was said, there was no precedent, had, in recurring to
the old principles of the common law, supported the statute on the
broad grounds stated in Rex v. Waddington, the analogy would
have been much closer than it was to the dictum of Lord Hale.
49 I East 163-r64.
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If, then, this statute can be brought under the common law
forbidding the doing of anything which enhances unduly the nec-
essaries of life, in what direction does this lead us? It would be
an expression of the approval by the Supreme Court of restric-
tions put upon monopolies of anything necessary to the public.
Such an approval would undoubtedly commend itself to the
minds of the majority of the people of the United States.
The rapid development of Trusts and Combinations has
angered and alarmed the masses, who have constantly before
them the fear of being robbed by the capitalists.
The Hon. W. E. Russell, in the address from which I have
already quoted, says:
"You remember the thought expressed by Sir Henry Maine
that society, in its opinions and necessities, is always in advance
of law; that the progress of the one and the stability of the other
make a gulf between them, often closing, often opening; but
that the greater or less happiness of a people depends on the de-
gree of promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed. ,,s
It may be, then, that the Supreme Court, recognizing the
great and growing hostility of the people to monopolies in any
form, and finding that the law as it stood did not meet the popu-
lar desires, accepted this statute as an extension of the law to
meet "a new development of commercial progress," founding its
decision upon the common law, though upon unfortunate exam-
ples of it, and, thereby, in Sir H. Maine's words, closing the gulf
existing between the law and the opinions and necessities of
society.
Although, then, in a sense, this may be an extension of the
law to meet a development of commercial progress, it does not
follow that it is an extension forward. It would rather seem to
be an extension backward. For the principle that really received
the sanction of the Supreme Court was the right of the govern-
ment to interfere with all private property, with its use and en-
joyment, whenever it considers it necessary for the public good
to do so. My reference to Cooley's Constitutional Law has shown
that in old times it was customary to regulate almost every trans-
action of men by governmental rules.
"Such legislation," says Earl, J.,51 "may invade one class
of rights to-day and another to-morrow, and if it can be sanctioned
under the Constitution, while far removed in actual time we will
not be tar away in practical statesmanship from those ages when
50 Address to Yale Law School, p. 9.
51 In the matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 114-115.
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governmental prefects supervised the building of houses, the
rearing of cattle, the sowing of seed, and the reaping of grain,
and governmental ordinances regulated the movements and labor
of artisans, the rate of wages, the price of food, the diet and
clothing of the people, and a large range of other affairs long
ince, in all civilized lands, regarded as outside of governme ntal
functions. Such governmental interferences disturb the normal
adjustments of the social fabric, and usually derange the delicate
and complicated machinery of industry, and cause a score of ills
while attempting the removal of one."
This expresses in clear terms the ideas which have heretofore
been the prevailing ones in free, countries, and which were. sup-
posed to be especially dear to all democracies.
To repeat Spencer's words, "Feudalism, serfdom, slavery, all
tyrannical institutions, are merely the most vigorous kinds of rule,
springing out of, and necessary to, a bad state of man. The pro-
gress from these is in all cases the same, less government. Con-
stitutional forms mean this. Political freedom means this. De-
mocracy means this."
But does it? It was undoubtedly the idea of the older profes-
sors of democracy that it meant less government, the smallest
possible interference with the individual. I think, however, that
time has shown that this is not true. The tendency of every
country that is in name or effect democratic is towards more gov-
ernment, more interference with the individual. The practical
working of the decision of the State-of Kansas to prohibit entirely
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors furnishes an
example of an interference with personal liberty, and a disregard
of what have hitherto been considered as private rights which the
most despotic government would have hesitated to perpetrate.
In old days the people seem to have required protection against
their rulers, now they seem to require protection against them-
selves. Whether this is the outcome of the conviction, more and
more widely extended, that every action of man, however per-
sonal it appears to be, in reality affects his fellow citizens, or
whether it is that majorities are as strongly disposed as monarchs
to be tyrannical and impose their will on their fellow country-
men, I do not venture to say. But the fact is too plain to be dis-
puted, that the freer a people is politically, the more government
it has. It is almost pathetic to observe the growing belief of the
masses of the people that legislation can cure all the ills of life.
When, therefore, the growing power of combinations and
monopolies began to attract attention, the demand was for legis-
lation to suppress them. And here the gulf between law and
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social opinion at once opened. It is impossible to suppose that
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had in view any such
omnipotent exercise of the Police Power by the State as would
practically nullify the protection it afforded, and therefore any
decisions that have that effect have not been received with
approval by lawyers.
But what if the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment
should stand in the way of remedying matters that have become,
in the minds of the people at large, crying abuses? Here, then,
seems to lie the difficulty that the Supreme Court had to meet.
The people of Illinois believed that monopolies of this kind were
injurious to them; they believed that by controlling them by law
they could rid themselves of the evil, and they enacted such laws.
What would have been the effect if such laws, enacted, as the peo-
ple believed, to afford them protection against great injury, had
been declared unconstitutional by the highest authority in the
land? Would not the law have been so far discredited that every
means would have been tried to evade and pass it by? But
recently the question of legalizing the Sunday opening of saloons
has been agitated in New York, and the facts brought to light
seem to show quite clearly that a law that does not command the
assent of the people has very little effective strength.
Viewed from the standpoint of the political economist, can it
be affirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment must be so rigidly
interpreted as to make the welfare of the citizen subordinate to
the rights of private property? It has been said that the effect of
the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois is to put all private property at the
mercy of a leg slative majority. What would be the effect of the
opposite view if pushed to its logical conclusion?
It would be that the general welfare of the citizens, the price
of their food, of their clothing, of all the necessaries of life might
be put at the mercy of a few men who, in the lawful exercise of
the means open to them in their private business, might obtain
such control over the sources of supply as to fix the price of all
commodities at their will.
It is no answer to this to say that excessive prices are prohib-
itive, and consequently that a monopoly would be of no practical
value if carried too far. Before that point was reached there
would be a great deal of inconvenience, perhaps suffering, through-
out the country, and incentives to violence and crime would
be very largely increased.
Justice Brewer says :52
52 Budd v. N. Y., 143 U. S-. 517.
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"That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains
full control of, subject to these limitations: first, that he shall
not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that
he must use it for his neighbor's benefit."
This is very true, but in the state of facts just supposed, can
it be said that such a use of one's property does not injure his
neighbor? And if it does, where would the power lie to prevent
this injury if not in the inherent power of self-preservation of
society, which, if it is to be exercised peaceably, must act through
legislative channels?
In truth, viewed in this light, and setting aside the inapplic-
able technicalities with which the decision was supported, it seems
that the Court intended to lay down the principle known to the
common law, and in earlier times frequently put into force, that
there is a point beyond which the use of private property is not
lawful; and that that point is reached when, though by means
in themselves perfectly legitimate, the well-being of the commu-
nity is menaced by its use. And that when this occurs, the use
is one in which the public have an interest, and in the preserva-
tion of that interest are entitled to regulate the use so as to mini-
mize the injury. It may be called Police Powers, it maybe called
self-preservation, but Salus populi supre na est lez.
Before turning to the tendencies of this doctrine, it will per-
haps be well to sum up very briefly the conclusions I have drawn.
They are these:
x. That, taking the decision as it appears from the arguments
brought forward to support it, and from the authorities cited, it
fails to establish its conclusions, because the argument is an
attempt to apply the common law principles appropriate to legal
monopolies to a monopoly of fact, a very different thing.
2. That the real foundation of the decision is the desire of the
Court to recognize a popular demand, and by so doing to bring
the law into harmony with the wants and wishes of the people,
in the face of a new development of commercial progress.
3. That if the subject of the decision was one which menaced
the security and well-being of the community, the inherent right
of self-preservation is to that extent paramount to the right of the
use of private property by the individual, and is entitled to
enforcement by the common law, no constitutional provision
limiting, or having been intended to limit, this fundamental and
inalienable right.
The scope of this essay makes it now necessary to pursue the
inquiry as to the tendencies of the doctrine of property affected
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with a public interest, and in doing so I leave behind me the com-
paratively sure ground of legal principles and precedents, and
enter upon the slippery path of prophecy and conjecture.
The first thing of course that occurs to the inquirer is that this
doctrine strikes a telling blow at individualism, and lends a
strong support to the socialistic ideas of the day. To quote again
from justice Brewer:
"The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The
utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible
protection to him and his property is both the limitation and duty
of government. If it may regulate the price of one service which
is not a public service * * * why may it not with equal
reason regulate the price of all service, and the compensation to
be paid for the use of all property? And if so 'Looking Back-
ward' is nearer than a dream. "3
And this, no doubt, in the minds of those whose opinions are
formed on the theories prevalent during the greater part of this
century, is a very pestilent innovation. In a work just published
by Mr. Ernst von Halle, called " Trusts or Industrial Combinations
and Coalitions," which is a translation and amplification of a
report made by the author to the Verein far Social-Politik, a most
instructive and able exainination is made of the development and
conduct of the great combinations in the United States. On the
main portion of his work I do not, of course, propose to touch, as
it would be beyond my purpose, and, moreover, it should be
read in its entirety. But I mention it here because, in his first
chapter, the author traces the course of public opinion in the
United States in regard to monopolies. "The Constitution," he
says on page 2, "aimed at securing equal personal rights for
every one, and at prohibiting whatever might be attempted to
cripple them, or to interfere with the free transaction of lawful
private business. It was drawn up in the time of the complete
predominance of the 'physiocratic' doctrine of natural rights,
and the rise of the laissezfaire theory." And after showing that
these ideas permeated all public life for the first half of this cen-
tury, and that they seemed for a time justified by the want of
success attending State ownership, as in banks and railroads, and
of the opposite result achieved by individuals, he continues: "And
a disinclination for the interference of society with the sphere of
the individual was more widely diffused than in any other country.
To forbid as little as possible, and to regard what was not forbid-
den as silently permitted, to consider a right once granted as
53 Budd v. N. Y., r43 U. S. 517.
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irrevocable, these were the principles on which public opinion
was built. The device of free competition partook, in the eyes of
the people, of the character of an eternal, holy truth, remote
from the influences of time and economic conditions. Whoever
disregarded it was eo ipso wrong; his actions were against public
policy."
One or two references to authorities will show that this is cor-
rect. "Instead of saying that all private property is held at the
mercy and judgment of the public, it is a higher truth that all
rights of the State in the property of the individual are at the
expense of the public.M
LThe less the State interferes with industry, the less it directs
and selects the channels of enterprise, the better. There is no
safer rule than to leave to individuals the management of their
own affairs. Every individual knows best where to direct his
labor, every capitalist where to invest his capital. If it were not
so, as a general rule, guardians should be appointed, and who
would guard the guardians?' '
These, as Mr. von Halle shows, were the dominant ideas in
England in the eighteenth century. But in that country their
force gradually diminished until, in 1844, Parliament abolished
all restrictive legislation in this direction. But in this country
the courts did not adopt the English precedents. "They upheld
the validity of the unchanged common law and statutory restric-
tions, occasionally even of some repealed in England before the
time of the separation."
During the prevalence of these principles, the doctrine of indi-
vidualism was combined with that of laissez faire. But when
the changed economic conditions brought combinations into
existence, the advocates of individualism, in calling for State
interference, were compelled to abandon that part of their old
doctrine. As Mr. von Halle puts it in his introduction: "Advo-
cates of this principle (laissezfaire) certainly fall into their own
trap when they cry out for restrictions against things that have
naturally developed, and for State interference to secure the
unhindered working of natural forces."
In view of these facts is it so certain that the principles of the
doctrine of Munn v. Illinois are socialistic? May it not be that the
upholders of individualism against socialism, alarmed at the tend-
ency of combination to destroy the individualism of industry, have
abandoned their old doctrine of laissezfaire, and invoked the aid
54 Address to Yale Law School, 55 New Englander 97.
55 58 Maine 598.
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of the State to crush these forces which threaten the existence
of their cherished belief?
At first sight it would certainly appear, as I have before sug-
gested, that the exercise of the power of the State to control the
profit made in a private business is, in its essence, socialistic.
But against what is the exercise of the power specially directed?
Against a monopoly.
The principle involved in monopoly, whether by a single indi-
vidual or an association of individuals, is the destruction of com-
petition. Competition is the ideal of the individualist, the bMte
noir of the socialist. To the former it is the onl principle by which
the greatest good of the people is to be attained. Low prices,
high incentive, unlimited opportunities to every one by industry,
energy, and skill to carve out for himself a successful career in
what is always called the struggle for existence; all these are
obtainable only through competition.
Holding this faith, can the individualist view with anything
but alarm the growth, in any direction, of a principle so antago-
nistic to his scheme of life? He cannot meet the danger and de-
stroy it by individual effort, for easy though it may be to argue
that any one can break a monopoly, it can be broken only by a
force equal or superior to it in power. And that implies the
abandonment of principle in the formation of counter-combina-
tions strong enough to fight the monopolist on his own ground.
Feeling, then, his impotence, the individualist turns to the State,
and invokes its ass:stance as against an enemy that is sapping the
foundations of the national existence.
The principle, as I understand it, running through the whole
of the common law in its antagonism to monopolies, was that they
interfered with the free fight for existence which goes by the
name of competition in political economy.
I would submit, therefore, that the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois
may be regarded rather as an effort of individualism to stem the
rising tide of combination, than as socialistic; a stand made by
the individual rather than a move forward of socialism.
It can hardly be denied that the principle of combination is
growing every day in all the most progressive countries of the
civilized world. Whatever may be its ultimate fate, individual-
ism is at the present time losing its hold on the faith of mankind.
Possibly the intensity of the struggle of life in our time makes
the individual more keenly conscious of his weakness. Judge
Baldwin says: "John Stuart Mill has said that the great charac-
teristic of modern civilization, of the new world which mankind
YALE LAW JO U.RVAL.
is forming for itself, not in territory but in mind and action, is
that the importance of the masses is constantly growing greater
and that of individuals less. It may be a tendency to be resisted,
but it is certainly one that we must recognize, and recognize as
a constant force. "56 All around us we see the signs of the
tendency to combine. Perhaps the greatest instance of combi-
nation in modern times is that of the working classes in Trades
Unions. It almost raises a smile to recall the furious denuncia-
tions and direful prophecies which this movement called forth in
its beginning. But the times were with them, and they have
lived to become a mighty force in the industrial world, and a
force which, on the whole, makes for the peace and good order of
society. It is significant that the incorporation of Trades Unions
has lately been advocated by one of the coolest and least visionary
of English political leaders. And so, true it is that notwithstanding
all opposition on the part of those who do not read the signs of
the times, the principle of monopoly or combination gains ground
steadily and surely. What says Mr. von Halle, fresh from his
study of the subject in its most recent development in the United
States?
"While theorists still discuss the advisability, lawyers attack
the legality, and politicians doubt the constitutionality of the
principle of combination, we learn daily of formation of new
combines throughout the civilized world. This seems somewhat
to discredit the cheerful hopefulness of the believers in the ortho-
dox teaching that combinations are nothing but temporary aber-
rations from the natural law of free competition. At the same
time, it becomes evident that mere legal prohibition has proved
neither successful nor productive of any satisfactory results.
Men who were among the strongest opponents of all sorts of com-
binations a few years ago now officially admit them to be in cer-
tain instances the lesser evil. 57
The tendency of the doctrine of property affected with a pub-
lic interest seems, then, to be rather to support the individualist
than the socialist, and I venture to suggest that those who oppose
it on the ground of its socialistic tendency have mistaken its
bearing.
The error may perhaps have arisen from the line of argument
taken by the Court in the opinion, a line which, as I have tried to
show, was neither applicable to the facts nor sustained by the
authorities cited in its support.
56 Yale Law Journal, March, 1895, p. 136.
57 Introduction, pp. ix-x.
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The mistake seems to lie in assuming that the public interest
is created by the benefit conferred. Justice Field says in the case:
"This Court seems to bold that property loses something of its
private character when employed in such a way as to be gener-
ally useful." And Justice Brewer says: "I cannot bring myself
to believe that when the owner of property has by his industry,
skill, and money made a certain piece of his prop~rty of large
value to many, he has thereby deprived himself of the full domin-
ion over it which he had when it was of comparatively little
value; nor can I believe that the control of the public over one's
property or business is at all dependent upon the extent to which
the public is benefited by it. "58
If this were the principle, the doctrine would undoubtedly be
socialistic, for it would sanction the doctrine that .when the bene-
fit to the public created by a private business became sufficiently
large, the public might claim an interest in it to the detriment of
the owner.
But it is suggested that in this case the public interest was not
created by the benefit derived from the business, but by the ijury
resulting from it. The exact words used were: "When, there-
fore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use." These words, taken alone, might favor the construction
put upon them by the dissentients, but when considered in con-
nection with other expressions in the opinion, their more natural
meaning would appear adverse to it. Thus:
"A member of a body politic necessarily parts with some
rights or privileges, which, as an individual not affected by his
relations to others, he might retain. This does not confer power
upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and
exclusively private, but it does authorize laws requiring each citi-
zen to so use his property as not unnecessarily to injure another."
And later on: "The grain elevator business in Chicago was,
or might be, a virtual monopoly, and this notwithstanding its vast
importance. The business, therefore, if any business can be, was
clothed with a public interest, and ceased to befuristrivati."
From this it would certainly appear that the right to regulate
was derived from the injury caused by the monopoly to the pub-
lic at large. And this view is sustained by the language used by
Justice Bradley, one of the majority, as quoted by Justice
Brewer..
58 Budd v. N. Y., 143 U. S. 517.
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"The inquiry there (in Munn v. Ill.) was as to the extent of the
Police Power in cases where the public interest is affected, and
we held that when an employment or business becomes a matter
of such public interest and importance as to create a common
charge or burden upon the citizen, in other words, when it be-
comes a practical monopoly to which the citizen is compelled to
resort, and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from the
community, it is subject to regulation by the Police Power. -69
And according to the ideas generally prevalent, it may be
asserted that on this principle a like decision would meet with
general approval if a monopoly were created in any other busi-
ness which affected the masses of the people. To refer again to
Justice Brewer: "Surely the matters in which the public has
the most interest are the supplies of food and clothing. Yet can
it be that by reason of this interest the State may fix the price at
which the butcher may sell his meat, or the vendor of boots and
shoes his goods?" 60
I do not hesitate to assert that if a monopoly were created in
these articles, a demand for State interference would be too uni-
versal to be resisted.
I draw, then, the conclusion that the tendency of this decision,
founded as it seems to me to be on an injury to the rights of the
public, and designed as it is to prevent the destruction of compe-
tition by monopoly, is opposed to the principles of socialism, and is
an effort of the opposing party to stop the advance of its enemy.
My first ground for this conclusion, as shown above, is that
the legislation in question was against monopoly and: there-
fore in support of free competition.
My second ground is that the benefit to the public is not the
basis of the power to regulate, but the injury to the public.
On this latter ground, there is no taking away from anyone
that which he has honestly acquired by his skill, foresight,
energy, and industry. It is an action by the public to preserve
its members from threatened injury. "There is no attempt,"
says Chief Justice Waite, "to compel these owners to grant the
public an interest in the property but to declare their obligations
if they use it in this particular manner."
It is now nearly twenty years since this decision was made,
and if, as it seems to me, its intention was to support the old ideas
in favor of individualism and against monopolies, has it suc-
ceeded?
59 Brass v. Stoeser, i53 U. S. 391.
60 Budd v. N. Y., 143 U. S. 517.
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The answer must be, I think, no. If it has not succeeded, it
Is not because of the want of legislation in its favor. Laws have
been passed, constitutional provisions have been made continually
to prevent the further development of monopoly, and to preserve
the principle of free competition in all its vigor. But despite
them all, the opposite principle makes more headway each year,
bringing over to its side, as Mr. von Halle says, many of those
who formerly opposed it. The day of small things seems to have
gone by, and the struggle of the individualist against combina-
tion appears to be growing weaker. It is not necessary to illus-
trate this by examples. The fact is patent to anyone who reads
a newspaper. The ideas of men are changing, and the con-
stantly.recurring industrial difficulties, the more frequent depres-
sions in trade, over-production, diminution of profits, difficulties
with artisans, strikes, and the universal uncertainty and gloom
cause many to doubt the everlasting truth of the principles they
have heretofore held.
Mr. von Halle says:
"In the United States public opinion has to decide finally
about the meaning and nature of things. It will not be able, in
the long run, to lean upon mere theories and maxims, it will be
forced by the actual development to undergo changes, to reform
and remodel itself in correspondence with the great laws of
historical progress. The old ideas about the infallibility and
exclusive desirability of individual and unrestricted activity have
begun to fade. The masses still adhere to them, and are sup-
ported therein by the newspapers and politicians who prefer pop-
ularity to throughness or thought, and by the cheap economics of
old-fashioned every-day economists, who are not able to perceive
that since the time of their youth there has been any change or
progress in practical life, as well as in the scientific interpretation
of it. But whosoever tries to understand the times, at once per-
ceives the different character of moderm problems, and the neces-
sity of new standards of judgment. "61
In what this tendency will result I do not dare to say. At
present it seems to be one that is so powerful that it is not con-
trollable by any of the forces brought against it by those who
oppose and fear it.
In "Looking Backward," the stupendous social change imag-
ined is founded on the development of the principle of Trusts and
Combinations, which are supposed by the author to have
61 p. 142.
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educated the people in the principle that competition is destruction,
and that in combination lay the remedy for our social troubles.
He shows how the great corporations and trusts passed through a
time of desperate populdr opposition, but going on their way
unchecked by the clamor against them, they finally absorbed all
the small capitalists in, the country. By their action they had
educated the whole mass of the people into seeing that these
gigantic affairs had been directed with an efficiency and economy
unattainable in small operations, and that the larger the business
the simpler the principles that.can be applied to it.
"Thus it came about that, thanks to the corporations them-
selves, when it was proposed that the nation should assume their
functions, the suggestion implied nothing which seemed imprac-
ticable even to the timid. "6
It is curious to place side by side with the vision of the
dreamer of ten years ago the conclusion of the practical inquirer
of to-day. Says Mr. von Halle: "It is my belief that the future
belongs neither to the prophets of individualism, nor to the ideals
of the social democrats. Its next phases belong to social reor-
ganization. And the probability is that this will show a corpo-
rate character, and will be sustained and controlled by public
supervision."
Whether the present tendency to combination is to have per-
manent and far-reaching results destined to change the whole
social organization of the civilized world, or whether it is but a
temporary phase of feeling arising from the weariness and sense
of weakness and helplessness born of the keen and embittered
struggle for existence in which the modern world is engaged, I
cannot pretend to decide.
But that the tendency exists is not to be denied, and it is
rather because of its opposition to this tendency of the times
than because of its failure to command assent from the legal
profession that I look for the ultimate reversal of the decision that
I have been discussing in this essay.
W. Frederic Foster.
62 "Looking Backward," p. 58.
